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Article analysis:

The article "ICSID vs. WTO: An Economic Analysis of Procedural Rules" by Alessandro Romano, Chiara Sotis, and Bria Yifei Yan explores the differences in procedural rules between the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The authors argue that the efficiency of different procedural rules depends on the structure of the market affected by the infringement. In fragmented markets, government intermediation typical of the WTO might be efficient as small firms might not have enough resources to litigate a case without external aid. At the other end of the spectrum, monopolists and oligopolists operating in concentrated markets can capture most of the benefits deriving from a dispute and are more likely to have enough resources to litigate a case.

The authors suggest that within ICSID, a specific form of class action can solve collective action problems. They also advocate for an independent prosecution department that can litigate cases on behalf of small firms in front of DSB or enhancing the role of Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL). The authors propose introducing monetary compensation or monetary sanctions aimed at preventing strategic litigation as first-best solutions to prevent respondents' behavior from affecting settlements.

The article provides valuable insights into how different procedural rules affect dispute resolution mechanisms in international trade. However, it is important to note that some arguments made by the authors lack evidence or are one-sided. For example, they claim that up to 80% of cases currently litigated in front of WTO should have settled without providing any empirical evidence to support this claim. Additionally, their proposal for introducing monetary compensation or monetary sanctions as first-best solutions assumes that these proposals are feasible when they may not be politically viable.

Furthermore, while discussing interest group theory and collective action problems, the authors do not consider how power dynamics between countries affect dispute resolution mechanisms. They also do not explore how the interests of powerful countries may influence the functioning of these institutions. This omission may lead to a biased analysis that overlooks potential risks and limitations of their proposals.

In conclusion, while the article provides valuable insights into how different procedural rules affect dispute resolution mechanisms in international trade, it is important to critically evaluate its arguments and consider potential biases and limitations.