# Article information:

When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations? | Global Perspectives | University of California Press
<https://online.ucpress.edu/gp/article/4/1/67826/195128/When-Do-Withdrawal-Threats-Achieve-Reform-in>

# Article summary:

1. International organizations (IOs) often face pressure from states to reform, with some threatening to withdraw unless their demands are met.

2. Withdrawal threats are more likely to result in institutional reform when they are made by powerful states and limited in scope.

3. Less than half of exit threats are linked to reform demands, with many states threatening to withdraw due to conflicts with another state or for face-saving purposes without making reform requests.

# Article rating:

Appears moderately imbalanced: The article provides some useful information, but is missing several important points or pieces of evidence that would be required to present the discussed topics in a balanced and reliable way. You are encouraged to seek a more balanced perspective on the presented issues by exploring the provided research topics and looking at different information sources.

# Article analysis:

The article "When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?" published in Global Perspectives by University of California Press examines the effectiveness of withdrawal threats as a catalyst for institutional reform in international organizations. The authors argue that withdrawal threats are more likely to result in institutional reform when they are made by powerful states and limited in scope. They test this argument on an original dataset of withdrawal threats from all international organizations and states since 1980.

The article provides valuable insights into the dynamics of bargaining over reform and highlights the importance of state power in achieving institutional change. However, there are some potential biases and limitations to consider.

Firstly, the authors rely on media reports and IO archives to categorize potentially leaving state's demands, which may not always accurately reflect their true intentions or motivations. Additionally, the dataset only includes withdrawal threats since 1980, which may not capture historical cases where exit threats were used as a strategy for voice.

Secondly, the article focuses primarily on the effectiveness of withdrawal threats as a catalyst for institutional reform, without exploring alternative strategies for achieving change within IOs. For example, dissatisfied states can also use voice strategies such as lobbying or coalition-building to push for reforms.

Thirdly, while the article acknowledges that less than half of exit threats are linked to reform demands, it does not explore why states may threaten to withdraw for other reasons such as geopolitical conflict or face-saving purposes. This limits our understanding of the broader political context in which exit threats occur.

Finally, while the article notes that powerful states are more likely to generate IO reform through exit threats, it does not explore potential risks associated with this strategy such as undermining the legitimacy of IOs or creating power imbalances within them.

Overall, "When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?" provides valuable insights into the conditions under which exit threats can be effective at achieving institutional change but should be read with caution given its potential biases and limitations.

# Topics for further research:

* Alternative strategies for achieving change within international organizations
* Historical cases of exit threats as a strategy for voice
* Lobbying and coalition-building as strategies for institutional reform
* Reasons for withdrawal threats beyond reform demands
* Risks associated with using exit threats to achieve institutional change
* Power imbalances within international organizations

# Report location:

<https://www.fullpicture.app/item/26206476e9ddc1dcaba609369ecb5be4>